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Seven months after defendant
had installed a washbowl in a bathroom in plaintiff's house, the house was
damaged by water when one of the pipes became disconnected from a
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faucet. During the two weeks immediately prior to the damage the house
was unoccupied, but inspections were made every two or three days by
plaintiff's employee. Plaintiff sued defendant to recover for the damage
caused by defendant's alleged negligence in connecting the water pipe to
the washbowl. In a trial to the court, the evidence tended to eliminate
other possible causes of the disconnection, such as rough use or manufacturing fault. The trial judge gave judgment for the plaintiff, relying upon
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. On appeal, held, affirmed. Proof of defendant's control of the damage causing instrumentality at the time of the
alleged negligence will suffice to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur if
the plaintiff reasonably eliminates other possible intervening causes of the
damage. Rinkel v. Lee's Plumbing & Heating Co., 99 N.W. 2d 779 (Minn.
1959).
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence1 permits an inference2 of negligence which ordinarily places on the defendant the burden
of explaining the injury and rebutting the inference. Application of the
doctrine is usually restricted to cases in which the defendant at the time of
damage is in the exclusive control of the instrumentality causing the injury.3
However, in the principal case the court applied the doctrine although defendant had not been in control of the disconnected pipe for more than
seven months. Reasoning from its assumption that the question of when
the doctrine should be invoked is actually a question of how justice would
be most practically and fairly administered,4 the court held the doctrine
applicable if defendant was in exclusive control of the pipe at the time of
the alleged negligence.ti
The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is justified when all
the usual prerequisites6 are present because logic and common experience
then indicate that defendant is negligent. The burden of rebutting the

l See PRossER, TORTS §42 (2d ed.
2 A minority of courts hold that

1955); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2509 (3d ed. 1940).
the doctrine shifts the burden of going forward with
evidence; two or three regard it as shifting the burden of proof. See generally PROSSER,
TORTS §43 (2d ed. 1955); Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN.
L. REv. 241 (1936).
3 See PROSSER, TORTS §42 (2d ed. 1955); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2509 (3d ed. (1940).
4 Principal case at 782.
5 The court cites as precedent: Peterson v. Minnesota Power &: Light Co., 207 Minn.
387, 291 N.W. 705 (1940) (injury following fifteen days of normal use after installation of
stove by defendant, defendant also in control of the electric power which might have
caused the injury); Saunders v. Walker, 229 La. 426, 86 So.2d 89 (1956) (damage four
months after repair of an air conditioning unit). See also Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenberg Co.,
266 Wis. 630, 64 N.W.2d 226 (1954) (injury involving sealed unit in refrigerator nearly
three years after purchase). But compare Bluett v. Eli Skating Club, 133 Conn. 99, 48 A.2d
557 (1946) (plaintiff injured while roller skating a few minutes after skate adjusted by
defendant).
6 In addition to the exclusive control requirement it is usually said that the injury
must be a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone was negligent, and that
the injury must not be due to any voluntary act of plaintiff. See generally PROSSER, TORTS
§42 (2d ed. 1955); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2509 (3d ed. 1940).
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inference is not unduly onerous since the defendant usually has better access
to the evidence than does plaintiff.7 But the relaxation of the prerequisite
of exclusive control evidenced by the principal case does in two respects bear
upon the fairness of the doctrine. First, the inference of negligence is
weaker since the longer defendant has been out of control of the instrumentality, the greater is the possibility that some agency other than defendant caused the injury. Second, the more remote in time and distance
defendant is at the time of the damage, the less likely he is to have access to
evidence which might rebut the inference of negligence, either by proving
that he was not negligent8 or by showing that some other force caused the
damage. 9 Thus, the application of res ipsa loquitur in a case like the
principal one may have the practical effect of imposing strict liability on a
defendant, for it puts upon him a virtually impossible burden of rebuttal.
Some writers have recognized this close relationship between res ipsa
loquitur and strict liability.10 When the doctrine is extended to cover
cases in which defendant is not in exclusive control at the time of the
damage, it becomes less a rule of evidence and more a substantive rule of law.
The resulting strict liability can sometimes be justified, as in the "exploding
bottle" cases,11 where the bottler must realize that a certain number of
bottles will explode and is in effect taking that risk when he intentionally
puts the bottle in commerce.1 2 In the instant case there seems to be no
good reason for extending the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Plaintiff
rather than defendant had the exclusive right of inspection and access to the
facts at the time and place of the damage. If it is conceded that neither
party is in a position to explain the incident, there appears to be little reason to shift the loss to defendant who may well be innocent, and who is in
no better position to insure against or bear the loss than is plaintiff.

Kenneth Laing, Jr., S.Ed.
7 See McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §309 (1954); 9 WIGMORE, EvmENCE §2509 (3d ed. 1940)
(stating that the justice of the rule consists in the circumstance that the evidence is acces•
sible to defendant). But see PROSSER, TORTS §42 (2d ed. 1955); 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE
LAW OF TORTS §19.9 (1956).
8 See, e.g., Dunning v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 270 Ky. 44, 109 S.W.2d 6 (1937); Oliver
v. Union Transfer Co., 17 Tenn. App. 694, 71 S.W.2d 478 (1934). The difficulty in trying
to prove a broad "negative" (lack of negligence) by testimony that he was careful is illus•
trated by defendant's attempt in the principal case, at 782, 783. PROSSER, TORTS §43 n.23
(2d ed. 1955), states, "As the defendant's evidence approaches definite proof that the defect
could not be present, it is all the more clearly rebutted by the fact that the defect is there."
See also 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§19.11, 19.12 (1956).
9 See, e.g., Tyreco Refining Co. v. Cook, 110 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
10 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§19.5, 19.12 (1956).
11 See, e.g., Johnson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 235 Minn. 471, 51 N.W.2d 573 (1952);
Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, 307 Mo. 520, 271 S.W. 497 (1925). But see Loebig's Guardian v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 259 Ky. 124, 81 S.W.2d 910 (1935).
12 For a case in which the court considers this policy aspect in applying the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, see Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, supra note 11. But compare Loebig's
Guardian v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 11.

